The Hindu and PIB News Analysis 8-01-2025

Editorial 1: The rebounding of Pakistan’s Afghan strategy

Context

The return of the Taliban has made Afghanistan a ‘strategic moat’ for Pakistan’s security establishment.

Source: The Hindu Newspaper

Introduction

On December 27, 2024, the Director General of Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that 383 officers and soldiers of the Pakistani security forces have lost their lives in counter-terrorism operations during 2024. He also claimed that 925 terrorists and Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants have been eliminated in nearly 60,000 intelligence-based operations. While detailing Pakistan’s generosity towards Afghanistan, he nevertheless asserted that Pakistan will not allow its citizens to be targeted by the TTP, which is said to be enjoying a safe haven in Afghanistan. However, it is ironic that Pakistan itself has long provided military, moral and logistical support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, two former insurgent-cum-terrorist groups that now head the ousted regime in Kabul, during their battle against the Western-backed Afghan government and US security forces. Pakistan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq Khan visited Kabul in December 2024, where he held talks with top-ranking Taliban leaders to ease tensions between the two countries. But it is likely to be a diplomatic failure as it was during his stay in Kabul that the Pakistan Air Force carried out airstrikes on alleged TTP hideouts in eastern Paktika province on December 24. Afghan officials claimed that 46 people were killed in the airstrikes, apparently in retaliation to a TTP attack on a security checkpoint in South Waziristan on December 21, in which 16 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Getting into an even deeper mess, the two countries appear to be caught in a dangerous impasse: On December 28, Afghanistan’s so-called Ministry of Defence claimed attacks on multiple locations inside Pakistan in retaliation for the airstrikes. The Ministry’s strategic blunder: Interestingly, the ministry did not mention the fact that Pakistan’s territory was targeted, but, instead, chose to highlight that the attacks were carried out from beyond the ‘imaginary line’ – a term used by the Afghan government to refer to the Durand Line. The limits of Pakistan’s influence: These events highlight the limits of Pakistan’s ability to exert its influence over its former proxies through coercive means or diplomatic persuasion.

Strategic Mistakes and Consequences

Pakistan’s Afghan Strategy Falters: Pakistan’s Afghan strategy has now become a victim of its own success.

From “strategic depth” to “strategic gap”: Instead of evolving into a “strategic depth” for Pakistan, the return of the Taliban has made Afghanistan a “strategic gap” for Pakistan’s security establishment that appears to have no hope of escape.

Tit-for-tat killings further sour relations: The frenzy of tit-for-tat killings has dangerous implications as Pakistan’s already strained relations with Afghanistan have plunged into even deeper crisis.

Challenges from TTP

Shared ideological similarities: Pakistan faces significant challenges from the TTP, which shares many ideological similarities with the Afghan Taliban, leading to a growing perception that the two are two sides of the same coin.

Public pressure to act: Against a backdrop of inflamed emotions and growing suspicion, there has been relentless public pressure on Pakistan to retaliate.

The irony of seeking US aid: Nothing can be more ironic and farcical than a section of the Pakistani government pleading with Washington to come to its rescue.

Controversial measures and statements

Proposed US intervention: In response to the deadly attack on a military camp in Pakistan in December 2023, which was claimed by the Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), Balochistan’s acting information minister, Jan Achakzai, suggested that the Pakistan government propose offering the US “drone bases” to target terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Deleted proposals: Other measures included “special targeted operations,” airstrikes, closure of the border with Afghanistan, return of Afghan refugees and a gathering of the anti-TTA [Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan] political opposition in Islamabad. However, Mr Achakzai later deleted this controversial tweet.

General’s offensive remarks: When Pakistan Army Chief Gen Asim Munir coldly stated in January 2024 that, “When it comes to the security of every single Pakistani, the whole of Afghanistan be damned,” it only fuelled the narrative that Pakistan’s security establishment is largely ignorant of the nuances required to persuade the Afghan Taliban by means other than shelling.

Later conciliatory tone: It is another matter that later in a conciliatory tone Gen Munir appealed to the Afghan rulers not to give priority to the TTP “over their long-standing and benevolent brother Islamic country.” Misjudgements and historical oversights

Fantasy land of Pakistan’s ruling elite: When it comes to Afghanistan’s messy political dynamics, Pakistan’s ruling elite is living in a fantasy land, ignoring Afghanistan’s notoriety as a ‘graveyard of empires’.

Missed opportunity after 9/11: Instead of trying to extricate Pakistan from the Afghan conflict after 9/11, Rawalpindi escalated its involvement by chasing the wild dream of an unbreakable Pakistan-Afghan alliance against India.

Unexpected blast: The blast was inevitable, but Pakistan was extremely slow to react to the growing threats. Perhaps the only surprise is that the blast came from Taliban-led Kabul, which was considered a docile regime.

Miscalculation of Taliban-TTP nexus: It is shocking that Pakistan completely misjudged the Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus.

Creator of its own problem of terrorism

Pakistan’s own created problem: The problem of terrorism that Pakistan is facing is a problem of its own making.

Afghan policy and obsession with India: It is Pakistan’s Afghan policy and unnecessary obsession about the threat from India that is to be blamed for promoting jihadi extremism and terrorism.

Support to extremist groups: Pakistan is pursuing an ill-conceived policy of supporting violent extremist groups that are seen as capable of harming India and taking control of Kabul.

Misjudgement of Afghan Taliban

Taliban chess piece: Pakistan’s military was not unaware of the intransigence of the Afghan Taliban. Rather, it saw the Taliban as a convenient chess piece in the great game it was playing against India.

Imran Khan’s misguided celebration: Pakistan’s former prime minister Imran Khan, now in jail for defying the powerful military, had compared the Taliban’s return to Afghans “breaking the shackles of slavery.”

Realpolitics and ideological rigidities

Exuberance gives way to realpolitik: Initial euphoria over the Taliban’s recapture of Kabul faded under the unyielding realpolitik and ideological rigidities of the Taliban movement.

Confusion and paralysis in Pakistan: The result has been a surprising amount of confusion and paralysis for those in Pakistan tasked with reconciling the military and political aspects of its response that must fit together.

A pushback

Historical rejection of the Durand Line: No Afghan regime has ever accepted the 1893 Durand Line as the legitimate border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Kabul’s territorial claims: Kabul lays claim to Pakistan’s Pashtun areas near the border.

Border issues in conflict zones: The problem with international boundaries in conflict zones is that they are not red lines etched in stone.

Pakistan’s past complicity: After all, it was Rawalpindi that was complicit with the Mujahideen in violating the sanctity of the Durand Line during the so-called Afghan jihad against the Red Army.

Taliban opposition and the Pashtunistan issue

Setback from Taliban’s stance: The Afghan Taliban’s staunch opposition to the border fencing is a setback for Pakistan, which had hoped that the Taliban’s withdrawal would also quell the demand for ‘Greater Pashtunistan’.

Concept of Pashtunistan: The idea of ​​creating a Pashtun homeland by merging Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan was a central aspect of the demand for Greater Pashtunistan.

Resurgence of Pashtun Nationalism: The Taliban have done nothing to suppress Pashtun nationalism with Islamist ideology, instead, they are fuelling Pashtun nationalist sentiments against Pakistan.

Islamabad’s Pashtunistan Puzzle

No New Issue: Of course, Islamabad’s ‘Pashtunistan’ puzzle is nothing new, but the challenge to solve this puzzle is greater given the dangerous potential of the militants that Pakistan’s security forces face.

Taliban’s Provocative Stance: If not meant as a deliberate sarcasm, the Afghan Taliban’s scornful refusal to acknowledge Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a Pakistani province is tantamount to a call for Pashtun unity, which will further fuel Pakistan’s fears about Afghan separatism.

Challenges to Border Fencing: In all likelihood, Afghan border security personnel will continue to challenge Pakistani efforts to fence the border.

Fears heightened: The reality of facing indivisibility is often far messier, further complicating already strained Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. In all likelihood, Afghan border security personnel will continue to challenge Pakistani efforts to fence the border. Conclusion Given the alarming rise in terrorism blamed on the Afghan Taliban’s inaction, Pakistan is reluctant to unilaterally recognise the new regime in Kabul, as it did in the early 1990s. The magnitude of the challenge posed by the TTP to the legitimacy and authority of the Pakistani state, as well as the Afghan Taliban’s utter disregard for Pakistan’s persistent demands for credible action against the TTP, have left Rawalpindi with few options to create the conditions for political engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan.

The Hindu Editorial Analysis in Hindi 07 January 2025

The Hindu and PIB News Analysis 7-01-2025

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